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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE of UTAH

WALKER BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 8691

EUGENE R. THORUP,
Defendant

~and

Appellant

IDA VIOLA THORUP LAYTON,
Defendant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

FURTHER STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent's attorneys attempt to improve on
the facts of this case. But they do so by omitting
testimony that is vital and controlling as to ultimate conclusions. The plaintiff's case depends exclusively on testimony of a so-called expert on hand1
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writing, or an opinion of non-expert brother of
appellant. What is the expert's opinion based on?
It is on differences between endorsements on two
exemplar checks of Utah Power & Light Company,
and signatures on the two Deeds. The first rule of
such comparison is that the signature on the exemplar checks must be actual and natural signature
of the party, Mrs. Thorup. That was not proved
and were admitted for comparison over defendant's
objections that they were not properly identified for
such purpose. (R. 63,R. 20, R. 53, R.66)
Who identified them? Louis Thorup, who obtained the checks from Nettie N. Thorup. He
testified that the endorsements were obtained at
night and that he helped her sign. A guided or
helped movement is, of course, different from a free
hand. Legally it may be her endorsements, just as
an "x" might be, but it is not a signature to be used
for comparison. May we quote the testimony in this
regard:
On page 23 of the Transcript and Record 33
of Louis Thorup's testimony:
"Q. I believe in the direct examination at one
time you said you witnessed and helped her,
your mother, sign many papers?

"A. I have helped her.
"Q. Now by 'helped' what did you mean?
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"A. I guided her hand, helped her, guided her
hand. She couldn't see the line so I would
have to help her.
''Q. Many times?
"A. Many times.
"Q. Now how many times would you have to do
that?
''A. Well I would say 90% of the time I would
have to help her."
On page Transcript 20 and Record 30:
"Q. You say without her glasses her vision was
very, very small?
"A. Very small."
On page Transcript 16, Record 26, Louis
Thorup testified:
"Q. Did or did not your mother write a 'T' with
a broken back on the top, or non combined
top 't' that would extend it right beyond the
bottom part of the 'T'?
''A. 0, she has written them both ways.
"Q. And it just happens that the ones you have
here does not have the top part of it extended to the right?
"A. Yes, It happens that she wrote them"Q. Both ways?
"A. Both ways.
On page Transcript 20, Record 30:
"Q. Now were those signatures you are familiar with and were signed at night?
''A. Yes.
''Q. After dark?

3
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''A. vVell yes- That is because that is about the
only time I would see mother.
Louis Thorup again testified, Transcript 14,
Record 24:

"Q. Mr. Thorup, your mother had told you on
several occasions that she was deeding the
home and the property next door to Eugene
and Ida, didn't she?
''A. That was talked about, yes.
"Q.. Now these checks that you have shown and
receipts, they were signed right after, shortly
after your father's death, were they not?
"A. y es, s1r.
.
"Q. And she at that time was pretty much upset, was she .not?
"A. Yes, sir."
Louis H. Thorup also testified as follows:
(T.17, R. 27)
"Q. For years there had been talk of what your
mother planned on doing with these two
properties involved in this lawsuit, wasn't
there?
"A. Well yes. I will say that my sister was supposed to get the home that she has deeded
to her, but, of course, the other deal was
never consumated or came to a head, to my
knowledge.''
Merle Hinds, a neighbor, testified to a conversation with Mrs. Nettie N. Thorup in 1951:
(On cross examination, R. 44)
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''A. She said, 'I have given this home to Genie.'
Now that is the words.
"Q. And not that 'I am giving this home'?
"A. No. I don't recall any such thing as 'giving.'
"Q. All right, that is all."
Mr. Beattie (attorney) ( R. 50) :

"Q. You do represent Mr. Louis Thorup?
"A. I so represented to the court and I so stand
on my representation.
"Q. And you represent him at the present time.
.
''A. y es, sir.
"Q. And your objection was made for his protection and not as an interest in the occurence of this trial?
''A. That's correct.
(NOTE: Mr. Goddard evidently had not
seen many of the documents at 12 noon
on the day of trial. But he had picked out
two endorsements and had them photographed to use as grounds for his conclusion. He evidently made the choice of
exhibits before he saw many of the exhibits. See R. 51, T.41)
Admission - plaintiff's attorneys admit delivery of the deed to Ida Viola Thorup Layton.
(R. 97) That is, he admits the Warranty Deed,
(Ex. 2), was delivered to grantee, Mrs. Layton.
Now with the foregoing testimony omitted by
Respondent we contend that Point III of Respondent's Brief is entirely refuted. The exhibits used
5
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as a basis of comparison, ( 1) were not the free
hand writing of Nettiee N. Thorup. They, by all
the evidence of identification, were written by Louis
H. Thorup's guiding hand. And some were written
one way and others another way. As many exhibits
contradict the particularities relied on by Goddard
than uphold Goddard's distinctions. To establish a
writing as exemplar it must be proved to be the free
hand of the author. Plaintiff's own testimony
proved otherwise.
The facts of actual execution of the two Deeds,
Exs. 1 and 2, were proved by two witnesses present
and corroborated by a neighbor and by admission
of plaintiff's witness, Louis H. Thorup, that he and
Mrs. Thorup had talked about the deeds. If she
executed none, there would be none to talk about,
and if the Layton Deed, declared a forgery by Goddard on the same ground as the Eugene Thorup
Deed, were delivered by Mrs. Thorup, it is absurd
to conclude it to be a forged deed. Certainly, she
would not deliver a fraudulent or forged deed. And
an examination of the only checks cashed by Louis
Thorup that were also endorsed by him, show the
signature of Mrs. Thorup is very near the same
as on Exhibits 1 and 2. Also, Exhibit 11 shows
Louis Thorup's 'T', the united 'T' corroborating
his testimony as to helping her in signing. And it
is interesting that of the twelYe endorsements of
6
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Mrs. Thorup on checks in Exhibit A, not one of
them has an 'r' as in Exhibits 7A and 8A, the ones
used as exemplars by Goddard, but are the same
as on the _deeds. Also, as to Mr. Goddard's testimony, he had picked the two endorsements or had
them picked for him to photograph as 7A and 8A,
9A and lOA, before seeing all other exhibits. Why?
Because Counsel asked for a recess so he could
examine the others. ( R. 51, T. 41 )
From the foregoing evidence it seems clear that
the testimony of Goddard is based on false or incomplete evidence, and, therefore, of no effect. His
reasons for his conclusion were given and based on
the two enlarged endorsements, and nowhere on
other signatures. Nor did he consider testimony
as to guiding Mrs. Thorup's hand, or the signing in
different ways. (R. 26)
Exhibit A of twelve checks were admitted and
examined by the Court as part of the Motion for a
New Trial.
As to Point IV of Respondent's Brief, let us
say in response to the statements of Counsel about
the affidavit of bias, they are astounding. We think
the affidavit proved extreme bias and a violation of
our Rules of Ethics by the Court. Counsel writes
that the Motion is frivolous. Yes, the affidavit on
bias recites the conclusion is based on information
and belief. But the facts upon which the belief is
7
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based are not disputed, nor are they disputable.
Those facts are a matter of public record or in public print. ·It is almost inconceivable that under the
law, especially Rule 63 (b) the Judge should say the
facts recited show no bias on his part, and under the
Rule he is not authorized to judge himself. Respondent's Counsel say Rule 63 (b) does not apply to
Motions for New Trial. The Ianguage is that it applies to any 'action or proceeding'. Certainly the
making of and hearing and decision on a Motion
is a legal 'proceeding'. Dictionaries define in law
'proceeding' thus:
"Any action at law or equity instituted
in court: (1) As a judicial proceeding (2)
and of the various steps taken in a cause by
either party."
Likewise, Judge Van Cott had no right to refuse to refer the affidavit of bias to another Judge
for the Rule provides:
"If the judge against whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficieny of
the affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forth,vith certified
to another judge . . . "
As to Point 1 of Respondent's Brief:
In cases cited the acts of invalidity were specifically alleged as a basis of proof and the question
was not raised. In the case of Btttrnham v. Eschler,
116 Utah 61, 208 P. (2d) 96, defendant's questioned deed was upheld. And in the case of Bertoch
8
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v. Gailey, 116 Utah 101, 208 P. (2d) 2'53, the issue of
nondelivery was joined in the pleadings.
As to the case of Gibson v. McMurrin, 37 Utah
158, the Court only holds that in -the absence of
proof to the contrary one proved to be title owner
is presumed to be in possession. But in the case at
bar pleadings and proof show defendant-appellant
in actual possession under claim of title.
There is a Utah case in point on pleadings:
Rawson v. Hardy, 39 P. (2d) 755 at 758:
" ' Fraud, when relied upon as a defense,
must be specifically pleaded in an answer, as
well as in a complaint; the facts and circumstances relief upon should be set out, in order
that the court may know whether there was
such fraud as will be of avail to the pleader,
and also that the party charged with fraud
may know the nature of the charge, and be
prepared to meet it.' Wilson v. Sullivan, 17
Utah 341, 53 P. 994, 996; Muldoon v. Brown,
21 Utah 121, 59 P. 720."
We contend that the whole judgment should be
set aside as to both defendants. The judgment
against both defendants is based on the same insufficient evidence and involves~ concerns exactly the same people.
See: 9 Code Pr,actice and Remedies, pp. 9724-5:
"A reversal of a judgment as to parties
appealing will not operate as a reversal as to
parties not appealing, where their rights are
separated and are not equally affected by the
same judgment. But a judgment will be re9
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versed in toto where a reversal in favor of the
appellant may result in a miscarriage of
justice." (Italics ours)
9 Bancroft, Sec. 7404, p. 9735:
"Ordinarily a reversal of part of a judgment affects only the part appealed from;
but there are cases where the part appealed
from may be interwoven and connected with
the remainder, or so dependent thereon, that
the reversal should extend to the entire judgment."
See Note 4.
Respectfully submitted,
ELIAS HANSEN
J. GRANT IVERSON
JAMES M. CARLSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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